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The ethical landscape: 
identifying the right way to think about the ethical and societal 
aspects of synthetic biology research and products 
 
Steven Yearley, ESRC Genomics Policy and Research Forum, University of Edinburgh 
 
For special issue of J R Soc Interface on “Synthetic Biology; history, challenges and 
prospects”. 
 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
For most areas of significant innovation in science and technology a subtle balance 
needs to be established when it comes to the governance of new knowledge and novel 
inventions (see the series of studies since Nelkin 1979). Proponents typically make 
strong claims about the novelty, excitement and potential impact of their emerging field 
or area of technological advance. This reflects the genuine enthusiasm they feel for their 
projects, but also helps to mobilise funding and investment, and to excite political 
support (see Wright 1994: 115). There is always competition for research funding and 
for investment by universities, and new areas can only win significant backing through 
insistence and clear claims about the rewards they can bring. At the same time, the 
more novel the area, the greater the potential demands for regulatory intervention 
usually are (see Jasanoff 1990: 2-9). Innovators are generally anxious about excessive 
regulation and therefore their claims about novelty are commonly complemented by 
assertions that regulatory issues are negligible or have already been taken into account. 
 
Synthetic biology fits this generalisation almost perfectly. The area can make a very 
plausible case for its innovative qualities. Of course, the science itself has great novelty. 
The idea of finding a minimal “operating system” for life for example, or of investigating 
how biological parts function in novel “circuits”, or even of creating living cells and cell 
systems based not on DNA but around peptide nucleic acid (PNA) chains need no 
exaggeration or rhetorical boosterism to appear highly significant. But there are also 
additional ways in which synthetic biology’s novelty is manifest. 
 
There is firstly the matter of the potential applications of the technology. Though the 
potential uses in the short term seem limited (and mostly to resemble existing 
techniques of genetic engineering), proponents offer visions in which highly innovative 
biological systems are engineered to produce hydrogen or other fuels. There are also 
ideas about the engineering of biological systems to synthesise medically important 
molecules and even to deliver them to specific locations within living organisms. Other 
suggestions hinge on developing bacteria or other simple biological entities that can 
clean up environmental toxins or remediate contaminated land. In a period when 
governments the world over are concerned about finding technological routes to avoid 
carbon dependence, the idea of efficient biological factories for hydrogen production is 
inevitably attractive. 
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Alongside these ideas about practical interventions there is also a procedural novelty 
about synthetic biology: the way that it can take advanced genetic engineering to the 
‘garage’ level. At least among some exponents – and in a sense institutionalised in the 
celebrated annual iGEM (international Genetically Engineered Machine) competition 
which involves undergraduates and even high-school students across the world – one 
finds the idea that genuinely novel work can be done by relatively untrained people 
using commonly available equipment and materials. Just as in the world of IT and 
electronics where a number of powerful and commercially successful initiatives have 
been initiated outside the academy and beyond the walls of established corporations, 
synthetic biology could potentially be undertaken by enthusiasts in informal  
‘laboratories’. As commercial sources of oligonucleotides proliferate and as DNA 
synthesisers fall in cost and rise in speed, the feasibility of these claims only increases 
(see Vriend 2006). 
 
The exact implications of this potential are contested and, in detail, unforeseeable but in 
the IT world such garage practitioners have given rise to enormously innovative firms 
and tremendous creativity, as well as to hackers and persistent distributors of viruses. 
There seems no reason to suppose that biological research could not develop along 
similar lines. And the already-demonstrated capacity to synthesise actual viruses from 
biological precursors suggests that the unwanted side of this move to ‘garage 
production’ is as likely as the positive one, even in the case of synthetic biology. 
 
To summarise this introduction therefore, in the case of synthetic biology there are 
strong arguments about the scientific and intellectual novelty of the area, about the 
potential range of applications which could likely result, and even about the wide range 
of potential practitioners that could become involved. But directly corresponding to each 
of these is a kind of regulatory concern. If the entry barriers are low for a form of 
scientific practice with dramatic implications then – arguably – the need for regulatory 
control over access is great since no one wants unlicensed operators releasing 
experimental organisms. If there are likely to be extensive opportunities for application 
within the human body and in the open environment (for energy production or novel 
forms of bioremediation) then the release and safety-testing implications are potentially 
enormous. Lastly, if this technology does give people new power over the fabrication of 
entirely new forms of life (truly intelligent design as some have quipped) then this might 
eclipse the ethical and moral concern over granting licences for experiments on admixed 
embryos which was so conspicuous in the UK in 2008. 
 
At this stage my argument does not depend on any of these claims about the intellectual 
or practical aspects of synthetic biology being correct or likely to take place; the point is 
that once these assertions about far-reaching novelty or widespread applicability are 
made the regulatory implications are hard to avoid. The more strongly the claims are put 
forward, the more powerful the apparent regulatory logic. Proponents of synthetic 
biology need to make claims about its startling novelty and wide-ranging implications if 
they are to win support, yet they cannot make these claims without simultaneously 
raising questions about suitable safety and regulatory standards.  
 
In this case the regulatory demand has been recognised and acknowledged within the 
synthetic biology community (or perhaps ‘communities’) itself. In the UK and Europe the 
analogy with the public controversies over GMO plants and foodstuffs has been widely 
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noted. There is a concern to avoid the polarisation of views which characterised that 
controversy (see Yearley 2005: 159-74). In the US the analogy with the Asilomar 
Conference on Recombinant DNA in 1975 has been at least as much to the fore, and the 
topic has also been widely discussed in the light of the increased terrorist threat this 
century and the response in terms of Homeland Security and the regulations that go 
with it. As is well known, a key feature of the Asilomar meeting was that the scientific 
community developed its own protocols on biosafety in advance of external regulation. 
The meeting was able to put forward its own biosafety methodology (essentially the 
proposal was to match the containment strategy to the level of risk posed by the 
material being worked on, using a straightforward classification of risk levels (Bennett et 
al 1986: 12)) and to advance ideas about how a national policy advisory body should be 
constituted: as an advisory body to the NIH (Wright 1994: 154). 
 
Already, ethical and social issues relating to synthetic biology have been acknowledged 
by many of the leading research entities and some forms of ethical reflection have been 
set up alongside research initiatives: in the USA, the NSF Synthetic Biology Engineering 
Research Center (SynBERC) has a human practices “thrust” (alongside thrusts on 
chassis, on parts and on devices), iGEM now includes a component on ethical and social 
reflection, the EU synthetic biology programme has a funded project entitled Synbiosafe, 
and in the UK the BBSRC commissioned its own social and ethical challenges review 
(Balmer and Martin 2008). Clearly, it is impressive that the awareness of the possible 
implications is sufficiently advanced that researchers have taken this initiative, though of 
course it is also a smart move in pragmatic terms both to anticipate regulatory review 
and to display one’s concern with such matters. As Wright noted of the intense debates 
at Asilomar, ‘Being regulated by one’s colleagues troubled some researchers, but that it 
might preempt externally administered controls acted as a powerful pressure toward 
achieving consensus’ (1994: 153).  
 
Recognising the role for this kind of review and even deciding to undertake the process 
is one thing, but there remains the question of what such a review should look like. 
What counts as an adequate ethical and social review in such an area and where can 
one turn for a template or pattern? Moreover, how does one establish the integrity of 
such an undertaking? In the next sections of this paper what I propose to do is to 
analyse one well known example cited by leading synthetic biologists. I shall consider 
both the nature of the arguments in this example and the model for ethical review that 
appears to inform it. Then I shall consider this example in the light of the tradition of 
institutionalised bioethical review as it has developed in the last two decades. Finally, in 
the fourth section, I shall specify how insights drawn from the case of bioethics can be 
helpfully applied in reflecting on the case of synthetic biology. 
 
2. ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS IN SYNTHESIZING A MINIMAL GENOME  
 
In his 2007 UK tour to promote his then newly published autobiography (2007), and 
thus his whole synthetic biology enterprise, Craig Venter responded to concerns about 
the societal and human implications of his version of synthetic biology by, among other 
things, noting that he and his colleagues were alert to these issues, even to the extent 
that they had commissioned a review – published in Science – of ‘Ethical considerations 
in synthesizing a minimal genome’ (Cho et al 1999). This is indeed an uncommon move 
for a research scientist to make. 
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Though this paper was published in 1999, Venter was still invoking it as evidence of his 
engagement with the societal implications of his research several years later and thus it 
is worth commenting on the suitability of the work undertaken in that paper for the 
purposes that Venter apparently had in mind. While Cho et al’s publication is well known, 
it is worth reviewing its contents briefly here for two reasons. First, it is interesting to 
see what kinds of issue are taken to fall within the areas of ‘ethical considerations’ as 
Cho et al construe them and thus to identify what kind of template or model for ethical 
review inform their work. Second, it is important to assess how much purchase the 
reasoning about these ethical considerations has on the conclusions and policy 
recommendations of that paper. 
 
Cho et al’s paper begins by noting that ‘Efforts to create a free-living organism with a 
minimal genome … provide an opportunity for proactive identification and debate of the 
associated ethical issues’ (p. 2087) because the capability of making such organisms is 
thought to be a long way off. In other words, precisely because we are only at the 
development stage (this is 1999), there is a valuable opportunity to lay out and refine 
the relevant ethical issues. The paper spends the first few hundred words on the nature 
of this space for work on a minimum genome. It then turns to conceivable applications 
and the social or policy implications they might have. 
 
This section consists principally of a listing of possible implications: that synthesised alien 
species could ‘wreak ecological havoc’ (p. 2088) as imported species sometimes have; 
that restrictive patenting could cause serious problems for a field that requires the ‘use 
of large numbers of genes simultaneously’ (p. 2088); and the danger of use of synthetic 
biology knowledge for biological weapons production (p. 2088). Though the potential 
problems are outlined reasonably well and even-handedly, no assessment nor ethical 
conclusion is provided. Instead comments are made such as ‘we need to give serious 
thought to monitoring and regulation at the level of national and international public 
policy’ (p. 2088). Although the authors highlight things that people may have ethical 
concerns about, the paper does not set out or determine what the ethical analysis might 
conclude. 
 
The next section focuses on what might be termed more existential issues. It is 
concerned with the implications for our understanding of life of the reductionist project 
of which the ‘attempt to model and create a minimal genome represents the culmination’ 
(p. 2089). The authors note the possible worry that reductionist approaches could limit 
the ways that ‘life’ is understood in the biological sciences. It may also have implications 
for broader philosophical notions about the nature of human life: the reader is reminded 
that ‘at least since Aristotle, there has been a tradition that sees life as something more 
than merely physical’ (p. 2089). This too appears to be a rather minimal claim, unless a 
lot is concealed in what the term ‘merely physical’ might mean. People (or indeed 
philosophers) might readily agree that life is something more than merely physical 
without at all agreeing about what is to be valued in life. Though the authors do not say 
this explicitly, one of their chief concerns seems to be that a theory or even heuristic of 
reductionism in synthetic biology studies might get mistaken for the metaphysical reality 
of reductionism; in other words they seem to worry that will conclude that synthetic 
biology has shown that all the important aspects of living systems are to be found at the 
molecular level. Thirdly, they suggest that reductionism might have implications for 
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debates about when life begins. A reductionist view – they suggest – might lead one to 
think there has to be a scientific answer to the question of when life originates, whereas 
other views of life might indicate that there is no point in trying to resolve the question 
in purely scientific terms. 
 
There then follows a section on religious beliefs. The authors stress that science and 
religion need not be at odds but indicate that one area of potential conflict could be over 
the issue of ‘playing God’ by engineering life when the making of life might be viewed as 
a divine prerogative or as hubristic for humans. They suggest that a ‘good steward’ view 
of humans might allow a sensible position between pessimism and over confidence: 
‘Moving forward with caution requires that the scientific communities be in continual 
conversation with the entire [sic] society, working together to address key ethical and 
religious concerns’ (p. 2090). 
 
This review of ethical conclusions concludes that: 
The prospect of constructing minimal and new genomes does not violate any 
fundamental moral precepts or boundaries, but does raise questions that are 
essential to consider before the technology advances further. How does work on 
minimal genomes and the creation of new free-living organisms change how we 
frame ideas of life and our relationship to it? How can the technology be used for 
the benefit of all, and what can be done in law and social policy to ensure that 
outcome? The temptation to demonize this fundamental research may be 
irresistible. However, the scientific community and the public can begin to 
understand what is at stake if efforts are made now to identify the nature of the 
science involved and to pinpoint key ethical, religious, and metaphysical questions 
so that debate can proceed apace with the science. The only reason for ethics to 
lag behind this line of research is if we choose to allow it to do so (p. 2090). 
 
As I noted above, in many ways Cho et al gives an interesting review of the field. But it 
spends much less time doing ethical analysis than in sketching the kinds of issues about 
which people might have ethical concerns. Though it is invoked by Venter as an example 
of an ethical review, it does not actually come to ethical conclusions nor use ethical 
principles to pass judgements on the likely ethical and social implications of synthetic 
biology. Instead it somewhat uncontroversially suggests that now (at least, 1999) would 
be a good time to hold such a review. Moreover, it is rather misleading about how 
straightforward such an exercise might be. As stated in the quote above, Cho et al call 
for ‘scientific communities [to] be in continual conversation with the entire society’. Of 
course, it is a good ambition to consider the needs and maybe the views of all sectors of 
society, but the idea of continual conversation with the entire society is clearly 
Panglossian. It sounds reassuring and attractive, but is patently unrealistic and cannot 
represent a serious practical ambition. 
 
Second, it is conspicuous that the report hovers uncertainly between giving a 
professional ethicist’s analysis of the leading concerns and anticipating what the ‘popular’ 
ethical considerations may be. For example, the question about the connection between 
synthetic biology and debates over the point at which an individual’s life begins might be 
expected to play a large part in public and political controversies over the new science 
and technology because of links to abortion politics. This is likely a shrewd estimation of 
how the public debate might take shape given, for example, the way in which policy 
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towards embryonic stem cell work developed in the USA under President George W 
Bush. Opponents of embryonic stem cell research sometimes mobilised the argument 
that embryos were already living humans; they thus had a keen interest in debates over 
when life originates. But noting how these issues are deployed is not the same thing as 
an ethicist’s evaluation of the key issues. No professional ethicist is going to follow the 
line of thinking about which the report warns; the ethical debate about abortion is 
already very rich, and ethicists (and activists) know all the intellectual moves that people 
are likely to make. The advent of synthetic biology will not change these. Yet the report 
lumps together the worries that ethicists are likely to regard as serious ethical concerns 
with other worries that members of society are likely to voice. 
 
There is a third consideration here, not about the kinds of argument advanced but about 
the design of the ethical review process itself. The review does highlight some potential 
concerns and possible disadvantages around synthetic biology but it does not call for a 
halt to the development of synthetic biology (as some environmental NGOs have done) 
nor any far-reaching restrictions. I am not arguing for such an outcome myself, but 
simply raising the question of what would have happened had this been the conclusion. 
There is inevitably a question about where one goes for a disinterested and an as-
objective-as-possible assessment in such a controversial area. The key difficulty is this: 
given the scientific and commercial interests in favour of developing synthetic biology 
and the determined opposition of some environmental groups, where does one source 
warrantably impartial ethical advice and, supposing one could find it, would the actors in 
the controversy accept its conclusions. The continuing close connection between the 
commissioners of such reviews and people conducting the review suggest that this is not 
an easy problem to resolve (see for example Garfinkel et al 2007). 
 
To conclude this section, I have examined one widely-cited review. Though it is invoked 
as an ethical review, it – somewhat surprisingly – does not actually carry out much 
ethical reviewing. By being styled as an ethical review, Cho’s paper looks as though it 
will offer some practical interventions in the same way that ethical reviews in medical 
contexts commonly do. In fact, however, it largely avoids coming to decisive ethical 
conclusions and mostly limits itself to calls for further dialogue over ethical matters. 
Furthermore, it mixes empirical issues (what people will likely worry about) with 
normative ones (what ethicists think people should worry about), and does not 
demonstrably deal with concerns about the objectivity and impartiality of the review 
process itself. It is time now to look in a different way at this very notion of an ethical 
review. I shall use the example of one areas where ethical review has been successfully 
institutionalised to see how some of these difficulties have been approached or 
addressed in a related field.  
 
3. BIOETHICS AS A MODEL OF ETHICAL REVIEW FOR SYNTHETIC BIOLOGY 
 
The challenge of trying to work out what an ethical review of a topic such as synthetic 
biology should comprise, and of who should undertake it, is not unprecedented. On the 
contrary, the question is similar to the more long-standing matter of how to conduct 
reflection and wise review in bioethics and biomedical policy more generally. Indeed, one 
could argue that the proposal for an ‘ethical review’ in the case of synthetic biology 
appeals precisely because the practice of ethical review has both been well established 
and apparently successful in the field of bioethics in the last decade and a half. Bioethics 
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is now institutionalised in the US medical system, and elsewhere to a lesser extent, and 
has achieved a form of monopoly ethical authority. 
 
Recently, the US sociologist John H Evans (2002) has carried out a study of the way in 
which a certain conception of bioethics became institutionalised and professionalised in 
the USA. What Evans observes is that there has been what he terms a ‘thinning’ of the 
ethical debate from the 1980s into the 2000s. Nowadays, he suggests, the principal 
participants argue over issues almost exclusively in terms of a restricted set of 
considerations. Many key participants no longer contest with each other in terms of 
ultimate goals but focus instead on a limited set of formal criteria, such as autonomy. 
 
Rather than ascribe this thinning to a necessary accommodation to value differences in a 
multicultural and multi-faith society, Evans proposes that this strategy emerged as the 
unintended consequence of conflict between professional groups who were all seeking to 
gain influence in the world of human genetics, its governance and its interpretation. Out 
of governance arrangements such as those proposed at the Asilomar meeting came a 
regulatory landscape dominated by appointed advisory bodies. These bodies found it 
easy to work with an approach that came to be known as ‘principlism’, an intellectual 
strategy that focused on a principle-based system of ethics. Rather than argue about 
ultimate ethical ends, protagonists began to claim that their view (against or in favour of 
restrictions of work on human embryonic stem cells and so on) was superior in terms of 
accepted ethical principles. The four central principles are now known and taught 
worldwide: beneficence, nonmaleficence, autonomy and justice. Participants ‘in the 
debate began to adopt this new form of argumentation largely because they thought it 
was the best way to make ethical decisions in light of the new decision-makers, the 
commissions’ (2002: 37 original emphasis). Those who wanted to take part – 
philosophers, theologians, patients’ activists, scientists and so on – increasingly 
restricted themselves to framing their arguments in ‘principlist’ terms. The arguers 
thinned their own arguments and ‘like all processes of institutionalization, in time the 
form of argumentation took on a life of its own, somewhat independent of the social 
conditions of government advisory commissions that gave it birth’ (2002: 37). 
 
Evans is not primarily seeking to evaluate principlism in philosophical or ethical terms; 
rather, he is trying to explain how it came to be the dominant framing of bioethics issues 
in many public contexts, from hospitals and health practices right up to Federal research 
bodies. He argues that it has become a kind of lingua franca in which representatives of 
different perspectives try to win over the advisory bodies. But, by couching their 
arguments in these terms (rather than in more traditional religious terms or in terms, 
say, of promoting medical research for its own sake) the participants tend to reinforce 
this way of conceiving of bioethical arguments. From an ethical language that was 
chosen, it becomes the way to talk about bioethics; it even begins to look like the only 
commonsensical way to reflect on these issues. ‘People who entered these debates and 
who adopted this new form of argumentation – or people who converted to it – began 
calling themselves “bioethicists” and not scientists, theologians, or philosophers. A new 
profession was born’ (2002: 37). 
 
But Evans does also have an ethical concern about where this new professional 
orthodoxy and the pervasiveness of principlism will lead. A long quote from his book 
indicates what he feels is at stake: 
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If one were to ask a focus group of people unfamiliar with the debate about 
germline human genetic engineering (HGE) to come up with arguments against 
the practice, they would probably not think to raise the argument that germline 
HGE is wrong because persons not yet born at the time of the research had not 
given their informed consent to risks to their own genome. Yet this was one of 
the few arguments against germline HGE considered legitimate in bioethical 
debate in the 1990s. I suspect that my imaginary focus group would think it odd 
to conceive of intergenerational responsibility through the language of consent, 
rather than responsibility, and they would likely find it pointless to enter a debate 
premised on getting impossible consent from not yet existing people (Evans 2002: 
11). 
In other words, people in the USA who wanted to fashion arguments about human 
genetic engineering for use in public contexts found that they had to construct their 
arguments out of the four building blocks of principlism, and they fastened onto 
autonomy. A way of expressing distaste with practices that would lead to changes to the 
germline was to claim that this impaired the autonomy of future people who might be 
affected by this change but could not – of course – consent. Evans’s view is that 
something has been lost in moral discourse when participants have to go to such 
implausible lengths to construe their concerns in acceptable terms. 
 
4. FIGURING OUT A SUITABLE ETHICAL LANDSCAPE FOR SYNTHETIC BIOLOGY 
 
It is clear that most of the leading actors in the world of synthetic biology recognise that 
they need to attend to the ethical and social aspects of their research. This appears to 
be both because they recognise that synthetic biology may indeed have enormous 
societal implications and because they appreciate – as Wright noted above – that 
regulating one’s own community is probably less painful than being regulated. 
 
What I have argued in this paper is that one obvious and superficially attractive way to 
do this is to conduct an ethical review, modelled approximately on the bioethical 
analyses which are now standardly conducted in healthcare and in medical research 
contexts. This approach is attractive for synthetic biologists for precisely the kinds of 
sociological reason that Evans outlines in the case of germline engineering and other 
topics. Bioethics seems to work, in that bioethicists help to make decisions at nearly 
every level in US biomedicine. Moreover, bioethics appears to have a sound and 
systematic foundation: it rests on the four pillars of principlism. Furthermore, many 
social groups, including mainstream theologians and activists, orientate themselves to 
this same ethical language. When they disagree with biomedicine’s positions or policies, 
they commonly express their disagreements in principlist terms. Finally, the principles 
have a kind of affinity with scientific thinking. They are universalistic and as Evans notes 
(2002: 153) ‘commensurable’, in the sense that other ethical concerns can typically be 
re-cast in the language of the principles. As ethical arguments go, these look pretty 
much like the laws or principles that scientists are familiar with. Scientists and medics 
readily feel at ease with the principlist language of ethics. 
 
However, despite these attractions, the bioethics review is a misleading model for social 
and ethical reflection about synthetic biology. Part of the reason for this is relatively 
straightforward. It is evident that some of the unease expressed about synthetic biology 
relates to concerns about allowing people (i.e. researchers and the enterprises they work 
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for) to develop novel forms of life. Cho et al present this as primarily a worry about 
letting humans ‘play God’. But other writers, such as the German sociologist Beck 
(1995), express this in a less other-worldly way. Beck notes that recent scientific and 
technological advances have, for example, freed societies from dependence on the 
vagaries of the weather but the same societies are now dependent for their security on 
the good behaviour of the operators of nuclear power stations. Vaccine programmes 
appear to have overcome many dread diseases, but the Cold War powers held on to, 
and even developed, new diseases. Our fear of ‘natural’ diseases has lessened, but we 
are left dependent for our safety on the military controllers of stored viruses. His point is 
that where we once feared nature, we now worry about the dependability of 
organisations and regulatory systems. In this sense, he argues, nature has been 
humanised (1995: 55). Seen this way, worries about hubris and playing God are not 
religious or spiritual worries but are directly political and sociological anxieties. They are 
worries about whom to believe and how to check the power of the mighty and secretive. 
Precisely because the outlook of principlism is non-political, it fails to attend to this 
dimension of people’s concerns. 
 
The bioethics review is also a poor model for desirable kinds of review of synthetic 
biology because the assumption of the centrality of universal ethical principles is even 
less applicable to these startling areas of biological innovation than to the case of novel 
medical interventions. One might say that beneficence and nonmaleficence are 
reasonable guides to interacting with our natural environment. But in the case of the 
environmental release of synthetic organisms the main public concern is not the ethics of 
the matter but the uncertainty and unpredictability of environmental impacts. In an 
important sense, configuring the kind of review needed as an ethical one is already to 
limit the forms of public debate and dialogue that are appropriate. 
 
Overall, my conclusion is that there is wide agreement that synthetic biology calls for 
care and oversight. But there is a risk of a precipitate move to organise reflection on this 
novel research using an inappropriate model, that of bioethics. 
 
Organising an ethical review of synthetic biology using the template seemingly offered 
by bioethics will be misleading. It will lead reviewers to focus on too narrow a set of 
concerns, on ethics but not politics; and it will lead them to be over-confident about the 
universality of principlism. It may look like an objective and science-friendly approach, 
but this appearance of objectivity will be misleading. Going down this route will be 
inadequate in its own right. But it will also be counter-productive since the apparatus 
constructed to conduct the social and ethical review will come to look like a mere 
legitimatory cloak for synthetic biology’s advance. I believe the need is not simply that 
synthetic biology be accompanied by some sort of ethical and social review, but that the 
review should be conducted in broader terms than those offered by the comfortable 
language of principlism. 
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